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Introduction  
 
Following allegations that private security guards were involved in the torture 
of Iraqi prisoners and in the wake an attempted coup by private mercenaries in 
Equatorial Guinea the proliferation of so-called ‘private military companies’ 
(PMCs) is again receiving considerable attention.
1
 Of particular concern in 
the public and academic debate is the continuing lack of effective national 
and international controls of the industry. Much of this debate criticizes that 
international regulation has so far focused almost exclusively on mercenaries 
and has been bogged down by problems related to defining PMCs. Moreover, 
it is suggested that national controls on PMCs are lacking in most countries 
with the exception of the United States and South Africa. 
     This article seeks to show that this debate is systematically underestimat- 
ing the level of national and international regulation of the sector and thus the 
possibility of strengthening existing controls. It suggests that in particular in 
Europe since the mid-1990s there has been a growth of national and inter- 
national policies which directly or indirectly shape the provision and export 
of private military services. Moreover, this article argues that due to the 
specific dynamics of European integration these controls are not only increas- 
ing, but also converging within the European Union (EU). 
     To support these arguments, this article is divided into five sections. The 
first section presents an overview over the state of the debate on the regulation 
of PMCs. The second section examines the limits of this debate and argues 
that these limitations might be overcome with a different approach to 
private military operations focused on services rather than companies and 
the ways in which they might be regulated. The third and the fourth sections 
present the current level of national and international legislation in Europe 
which affect the provision and export of private military services in Europe 
and abroad. Finally, this article discusses the progress towards and prospects 
of an EU regime for the control of private military services. 
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Private Military Companies and their Regulation: The State of the Debate 
Albeit recent events in Iraq have brought PMCs to the fore of media attention, 
the proliferation of private military contractors has been investigated in the 
academic literature since the late 1990s.
2
 The cause for this interest has 
been a perceived quantitative and qualitative shift in the use of private military 
forces. Not only has the scope of private armed forces grown significantly 
since the end of the Cold War, they have also taken on a new character 
through the emergence of private military firms with a corporate structure 
which distinguishes them clearly from the individual mercenaries of the 
1960s. 
    In particular two, now disbanded, companies have shaped the image of the 
contemporary private military industry: the Bahama-registered, but London- 
and Washington-based, company Sandline International and the South 
African private military firm Executive Outcomes. Both companies became 
notorious through their intervention in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and 
Angola.
3
 However, the intervention in Iraq has illustrated that private military 
companies are increasingly also employed by major Western powers as well 
as by a growing range of international organizations, private corporations 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which operate in confiict 
regions.
4
 
    Focused on these examples, the study of private military forces has primar- 
ily been concerned with the use of PMCs in failed states and regional con- 
fiicts.
5
 In particular, the literature points out two problems: On the one 
hand, many failed states lack sufficiently stable and capable national armed 
forces to provide for their own security or that of international actors 
seeking to alleviate the humanitarian problems caused by regional conflicts, 
on the other hand the same lack makes these actors particularly vulnerable 
to potential exploitation and power abuse by private military companies 
which are hired to improve security. 
    As a result of this conundrum, many authors highlight the potential of 
PMCs for peacemaking or peacekeeping in states and regions which have 
been wrecked by years of internal confiict.
6
 They argue that PMCs should 
not be conflated with traditional mercenaries. As registered companies 
which operate in a competitive market, PMCs are more likely to adhere to 
international norms and will refrain from excessive use of force or the exploi- 
tation of its customers. Thus, Doug Brooks contends: ‘Companies fear retribu- 
tion by their home governments for illegal or unethical operations, and 
recognize that a bad corporate reputation could result in the loss of future con- 
tracts to their competitors’.7 Moreover, Brooks and others argue that because 
private military companies do not require huge organizational structures, but 
draw mainly on lists of retired army personnel from the United States, the UK, 
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and Eastern Europe, PMCs can ‘offer military services more efficiently, more 
rapidly, and much more cheaply than state militaries or non-military compa- 
nies could do themselves’.8 
     At the same time, the literature recognizes the dangers posed by the use of 
PMCs in conflict regions. They contend that private military companies lack 
transparency, accountability and legitimacy.
9
 The use of PMCs in civil wars 
also exacerbates the spread of small arms and the militarization of conflict- 
ridden societies.
10
 Moreover, these authors note that PMCs are engaging in 
conflicts for purely commercial reasons. Close links between PMCs and 
extractive firms in the oil, diamond and mining industries are not unusual 
and can lead to the exploitation of unstable, but resource-rich countries.
11
 
Finally, they argue that the positive effects of private military interventions 
are rarely long-lasting. When foreign or native governments end their con- 
tracts, the initial lack of a viable national security structure often reasserts 
itself and civil war re-erupts.
12
 
     Therefore, most authors appear to concur that if private military compa- 
nies are here to stay, they should be controlled through international regu- 
lation.
13
 Yet, current attempts and future possibilities to control private 
military forces are generally viewed with scepticism. In particular, the litera- 
ture identifies three problems.
14
 The first concerns the definition of mercen- 
aries and private military companies for the purpose of regulating them.
15
 
The second problem is a perceived lack of interest among governments in 
the control of private military forces.
16
 The third is the transnational character 
of most PMCs which allows them to evade anything but global controls.
17
 
These problems, it is argued, explain why any effort to regulate mercenaries 
and PMCs short of an international regime would fail. However, they are 
also used to illustrate why national and international regulation has so far 
been limited. 
     The United Nations International Convention Against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 1989 is typically presented as 
the key example of the problems which characterize attempts to control the 
private military industry.
18
 The UN International Convention on Mercenaries 
has been marred by difficulties associated with a common definition of mer- 
cenaries and the reluctance among members of the international community 
to sign up to the convention. The definition of mercenaries embraced by the 
convention is based on the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention 
which stipulates that a mercenary is any person who is specially recruited to 
fight in armed conflict, does take direct part in hostilities, is motivated essen- 
tially by the desire for private gain, is neither a national nor a party to the con- 
flict, is not a member of the armed forces and has not been sent by another 
state as a member of its armed forces.
19 
However, since the definition pre- 
sumes that is it possible to analyze and prove the motivation of mercenaries 
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and since it requires that all criteria have to be met simultaneously, it is nearly 
impossible to convict any combatant as mercenary. 
    Another attempt at regulating mercenaries which is widely criticized is the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mer- 
cenaries in Africa, which was opened for signature in 1977 and entered into 
force in 1985.
20
 The OAU Convention, like the UN International Convention 
on Mercenaries, uses the definition of mercenaries of the Additional Protocol I 
and thus suffers from similar problems. 
    Finally, the literature points out that few countries have national regu- 
lations specifically designed to control private military companies - the 
only exceptions currently being the United States and South Africa.
21
 
 
 
From Africa to Europe: Moving Beyond the Current Debate  
 
The preceding analysis points to three problems with the current debate over 
the regulations of PMCs. The first is the predominant focus on ’mercenary’, 
i.e. combat, companies and their operation in failed states and regional con- 
flicts. The second problem is the definition of PMCs and mercenaries in the 
literature and contemporary legislation, and the third is the narrow conception 
of existing and possible regulation of PMCs. 
     This section argues that a comprehensive analysis of the regulation of 
private military service, and the potential role of the EU in it, needs to 
move beyond the current state of the debate. Specifically, it suggests three 
interlinked modifications: a broadening of the analysis of the privatization 
of military services from Africa to Europe and North America, a definition 
of private military contracts in terms of the services provided and not of the 
companies which provide them, and, finally, a broadened understanding of 
the means by which PMCs are and can be controlled. The following outlines 
the arguments for each of these modifications in turn. 
     As the preceding section has argued, mercenary companies such as Sand- 
line International and Executive Outcomes and their respective involvement 
in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola represent only a very small selec- 
tion of cases in the universe of PMCs and their operations. The majority of 
PMCs are providing more often military logistics and maintenance than 
combat soldiers and work for industrialized countries rather than developing 
nations in Africa. In fact, most private military and military support services 
are provided in military bases in Europe and North America.
22
 These services 
range from the management of military facilities and the training of fighter 
pilots to the maintenance of vehicles, ships and planes. However, PMCs 
also support international interventions such as in the former Yugoslavia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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    The extensive use of private military contractors in Iraq illustrates that the 
biggest market for PMCs is not in the Third World, but among the major mili- 
tary powers in Europe and North America. The growing interventionism of 
these powers and the resultant overstretch of their armed forces, which had 
been cut back after the end of the Cold War, fosters this development. In 
Iraq, one in ten US personnel on the ground is a private contractor, whereas 
in the Gulf war the ratio had been one in 50.
23
 
    Many of the larger companies operating in Iraq are based in Europe.
24
 This 
includes Aegis Defence Services, the new company of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Tim Spicer who formerly headed Sandline International, which was 
awarded a $293m contract by the US to coordinate security companies 
working in Iraq;
25
 ArmorGroup, now chaired by former UK Foreign Secretary 
Sir Malcolm Rifkind, which currently has ‘more than 1400 employees provid- 
ing security, specialist training and mine action/UXO services in support of 
many of the key reconstruction programs in Iraq’;26 Erinys, which is con- 
tracted to provide protection for Iraq’s oil pipeline and offers ‘site security 
and mobile security teams, convoy protection, diplomatic protection, key 
point and personal protective services’ for international companies and organ- 
izations;
27
 and Control Risks Group, which is, among others, employed by the 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office for personal security services.
28
 Most 
of the other major players are registered in the United States such as Kellogg 
Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, which provides logistics for the 
US armed forces; DynCorp which holds a $50 million contract for the support 
of public security;
29
 and the Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop 
Grumman, which has been awarded a $48 million contract for the training 
of the new Iraqi army.
30
 
    Closely linked to the broadening of the analysis of the privatization of mili- 
tary services from developing countries in Africa to industrialized nations in 
Europe and North America is the need for a different conceptual approach to 
private military operations. Such a definition should recognize the full range 
of private military services and the variety of companies which offer them. 
The latter has been exacerbated by changes in the private military and security 
sector which had led a growing number of private security, private policing and 
private armaments companies to offer military-related services.
31
 
    The conventional distinction between three types of private military com- 
panies, i.e. mercenary firms, private military firms and private security firms,
32
 
therefore misrepresents the composition and size of the industry. Although 
most authors recognize that these categories are at best ideal-types and that 
many companies provide functions across these areas, private security compa- 
nies, policing firms and armaments corporations are typically perceived as dis- 
tinct from PMCs and mercenaries with direct consequences for both the 
analysis of the industry and efforts to regulate it. 
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     This article suggests that a definition of private military force in terms of 
the services provided rather than the nature of the companies which offer them 
is more suited to the study and regulation of the sector.
33 
Accordingly 
‘private’ military services could be defined as services directly related to 
the provision of national security and to international interventions if they 
are offered by registered companies. A list of such services includes 
combat; personal and site security where this relates to the personnel and 
bases of governments or international organizations and NGOs operating in 
conflict regions; military training and advice; security consulting; technical 
support for the operation and maintenance of military equipment; procure- 
ment, trafficking and brokering of military equipment; explosive ordnance dis- 
posal; logistical support for military operations and bases; intelligence 
collection and analysis including the interrogation of military prisoners.
34
 
Crucially, a service-based definition recognizes that various types of compa- 
nies can provide these services ranging from arms corporations to risk consul- 
tancies. Moreover, a regulation which controls services rather than companies 
may apply to one firm in respect to a particular contract, but necessarily to all 
its business. 
     Although a service-based definition might initially seem confusing and 
difficult to implement in terms of legislation, it is common practice in 
defence export regulation. In fact, most attempts to control military exports 
are regulated through lists of controlled goods rather than through a regulation 
of the companies which sell them. Armaments exports and the transfer of dual- 
use goods, i.e. goods with civil and military applications, are thus legislated 
and any company regardless of whether it defines itself as a ‘defence corpor- 
ation’ or an ‘electronics firm’ is required to apply for a licence for any contract 
that includes the export of sensitive technology. Moreover, as will be argued 
in more detail below, the European Union has adopted a similar approach to 
control what it calls ‘technical assistance’ related to listed military equipment 
and activities. 
     A different conceptualization and definition of private military force has 
important implications for the analysis and prospects of the regulation of 
private military services. In particular, this definition reveals that private mili- 
tary services and the companies which offer them are currently regulated by a 
broader range of legislative measures than has been recognized by the media 
and the academic literature. Moreover, it suggests new and different forms of 
regulatory controls for the future. In Europe, these legislative measures range 
at the national level from the registration and regulation of private policing 
and security firms to the control of armaments exports and arms brokering. 
At the level of the EU, they include the European Code of Conduct on Arma- 
ments Exports and a range of Common Foreign and Security Policies concern- 
ing the transfer of sensitive technology and services to countries such as the 
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former Yugoslavia. The following two sections examine the controls at each 
level before discussing the dynamics which have led to the strengthening and 
convergence of national and international regulation since the late 1990s. 
 
 
National Regulations within the EU 
 
National regulation of private military services among the EU member states 
can be divided into three categories: the control of private security and 
policing services, the licensing of armaments exports, and the regulation of 
mercenaries and private military companies. 
 
Private Policing 
At the national level, the regulation of private security and policing is one of 
the key areas which influence the provision of private military services in the 
EU. Specifically, private military services fall under these controls where they 
involve the protection of property or people, where security personnel carries 
arms or where it regards the gathering of intelligence. Not commonly covered 
by these regulations are services related to military training, logistics or con- 
sulting, although this depends on the definition of private security services 
embraced by different countries and the level of regulation. An overview of 
national legislation on private security services among the 25 EU member 
states has been produced by the European Confederation of Security Services 
(CoESS) and shows significant differences in both areas.
35
 Some European 
countries, such as Denmark, Finland, France, Portugal and Spain, have 
strict and comprehensive controls. Others, such as Italy, have only narrowly 
defined regulations.
36 
What seems notable, however, is that from the 1990s 
nearly all European governments have stepped up their control of private 
security and policing services. 
    The prime mechanisms regulating private security and military services in 
the EU member states are the national registration and licensing of security 
companies and their personnel.
37
 The conditions for a licence, which on 
average needs to be renewed every five years, vary among the member 
states. However, all member states require a clear criminal record among man- 
agement and personnel. Additional conditions include sufficient liability 
insurance, identification cards with name and photo, and approved uniforms 
which are not easily confused with those of the police or armed forces.
38
 
    About 60 per cent of the EU member states mandate specific training of 
private security personnel and the passing of an examination.
39
 Training can 
range from basic instruction of between 32 (France) and 300 hours (Poland) 
to complementary and follow-up training, including for the protection of 
persons, the transport of valuables and the use of fire arms. With the exception 
of Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK, most member states allow 
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for the carrying of fire arms by security personnel with a special permit. 
Nevertheless, many states limit and request registration of the type and 
number of weapons concerned, and most mandate that after-hour storage 
has to be in special facilities.
40
 
    It follows that any private security company registered in one of the EU 
member states, even if hired for personal or site protection in countries such 
as Iraq, will have been required to go through a substantial vetting process. 
Although these conditions are only enforced within the territory of the regu- 
lating state, they are likely to improve the level of training and accountability 
among the major international companies based in Europe. Moreover, as will 
be discussed further below, the requirements of the internal market within the 
EU are increasing the pressure to regulate the provision of private security and 
military services across national boundaries. Already some export controls 
affecting the operation of private security companies abroad can be found in 
national legislation on armaments transfers. 
 
Armaments Exports 
While European regulations of private security and policing services so far fail 
to control the international transfer of military services, such export controls 
can be part of national legislation on defence exports. Specifically, national 
defence export legislation can include the prohibition or licensing of services 
such as trafficking and brokering in arms, technical assistance related to con- 
trolled military goods, and, in the case of Sweden, military training. Some of 
these controls have been the result of recent decisions within the EU; others 
have already been part of national legislation for some time. 
    In particular, the EU Council Joint Action 2000/410 of 22 June 2002 has 
encouraged controls of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses 
or destinations among the member states.
41
 The proposed regulations concern 
technical assistance related to items ‘which are or may be intended for use in 
connection with weapons of mass destruction or missiles for delivery of such 
weapons’.42 Crucially, ‘assistance’ as defined by the EU Joint Action covers 
nearly the entire spectrum of private military services, including ‘technical 
support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, main- 
tenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruc- 
tion, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting 
services’. Moreover, the Joint Action encourages member states to ‘consider 
the application of such controls also in cases where the technical assistance 
relates to military end-uses other than those referred to in Article 2 . . . and 
is provided in countries of destination subject to an arms embargo’. In sum, 
the Council suggests national legislation regarding the export of private mili- 
tary services related to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons as well as to 
any country subject to international arms sanctions. 
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    The second EU guideline for national export controls is the Council 
Common Position 2003/468/CFSP which sets out a range of provisions for 
the regulation of armaments brokering. Crucially, the Common Position 
requires member states to implement these guidelines though national legis- 
lation.
43
 The stated objective of the Common Position 2003/468/CFSP is ‘to 
control arms brokering in order to avoid circumvention of UN, EU or 
OSCE embargoes on arms exports, as well as of the Criteria set out in the 
EU Code of Arms Exports’. The Common Position mandates that ’member 
states will take all necessary measures to control brokering activities taking 
place within their territory’, but also ‘encourages’ member states ‘to consider 
controlling brokering activities outside their territory carried out by brokers of 
their nationality resident or established in their territory’.44 
    Since there exists no comprehensive overview of national arms export 
controls or the implementation of these guidelines among the EU member 
states, the following will focus on countries which offer the relevant infor- 
mation in English as illustrative examples. They include Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, and to some degree France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden. 
    The transfer of technical assistance related to WMDs and embargoed 
countries is controlled in Germany through the revised Export Regulation 
(Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung) of 2002. The regulation specifically requires 
the authorization of the transfer of technical assistance related to WMD or 
to embargoed countries if provided by residents and to non-resident 
Germans.
45
 Moreover, Germany also mandates licensing for technical assist- 
ance related to WMD if it is provided on European Community territory.
46
 In 
the United Kingdom technical assistance falls under the specifications of the 
new Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical 
Assistance (Control) Order 2003. However, the UK law only regulates techni- 
cal assistance with regard to WMD and if provided outside the EU.
47
 In Italy, 
the European Common Position regarding technical assistance has been 
implemented through the Legislative Decree No.96 of 9 April 2003.
48
 
Although the decree applies to both WMD and embargoed countries, it is 
more limited than the German and UK regulations in its definition of ‘techni- 
cal assistance’. Included in the Italian definition are only the ‘incorporation 
into military items’, ‘the use of production-, test-, or analytical equipment’ 
and the ‘use of any unfinished products in a plant for the production of 
[restricted] military items’.49 
    Following the EU Common Position, the trafficking and brokering in arms 
are also controlled in Germany and the UK
50
 and similar national regulations 
have been implemented or are in the process of being implemented in France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden.
51
 The new 
German export regulations demand the authorization of trafficking and 
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brokering in arms listed in the national control list or to countries subject to an 
embargo if they are conducted by German residents. In the UK, the trafficking 
and brokering of controlled goods to embargoed and non-embargoed desti- 
nations are regulated through the Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 and 
the Trade in Controlled Goods (Embargoed Destinations) Order 2004.
52
 
The former regulates the trafficking and brokering in restricted goods by 
UK persons or companies and persons in the UK.
53
 The latter requires that 
no UK person or company and person in the UK shall directly or indirectly 
supply or deliver any controlled goods to any person or place in an embargoed 
destination.
54
 France has also proposed legislation requiring a licence for bro- 
kering activity conducted within the country, but not French citizens living 
abroad,
55
 whereas Finland asks for licences to broker defence material 
within Finland as well as of Finnish citizens, Finnish corporations, and 
foreign citizens considered permanent residents in Finland who broker 
outside Finnish territory.
56
 Sweden has perhaps the most extensive controls 
as the Swedish Military Equipment Act requires licences for all types of 
defence industry cooperation with foreign partners, including not only the 
transfer of ownership and manufacturing rights, but also brokerage for 
Swedish authorities, companies and persons who are resident or permanently 
domiciled in Sweden.
57
 Moreover, the Swedish law is unique in Europe in 
demanding licences for the provision of military-oriented training.
58
 
 
Mercenaries and Private Military Services 
Although many European countries have national legislation prohibiting the 
recruitment of mercenaries,
59
 no member state of the EU has so far 
implemented specific regulations for the provision and export of private mili- 
tary services. A British Green Paper on the options for such regulations 
entitled ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’,60 which was 
drawn up in 2002, however, is currently being re-examined in the light of 
recent experiences in Iraq
61
 and is thus worth investigating. 
    The UK Green Paper begins by noting the definitional problems which 
have hampered the UN and OAU efforts to control mercenaries and PMCs. 
As a consequence, it examines the regulation of private military services 
and lists a variety of control options as well as the advantages and disadvan- 
tages of each.
62
 Specifically, the Green Paper evaluates three proposals: a 
national and international ban on mercenary activity, national licensing of 
PMCs and exports, and the self-regulation of the industry. The first option 
would be the most effective, but is dismissed by both the Green Paper and a 
subsequent report from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
on the grounds that it would be too difficult to enforce because of the 
problem of defining mercenary activities, would ’deprive weak but legitimate 
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governments of needed support’, and would deprive British defence exporters 
of legitimate business.
63
 
    The second option appears to be favoured by both documents, although 
there are different possible variations on the degree and form of national licen- 
sing. The Green Paper specifically discusses the licensing of contracts for mili- 
tary and security services abroad. It states that activities for which licences 
may be required might include: 
 
      recruitment and management of personnel, procurement and mainten- 
      ance of equipment, advice, training, intelligence and logistical support 
      as well as combat operations. . . . For services for which licences were 
      required, companies or individuals would apply for licences in the 
      same way as they do for licences to export arms (though not necessarily 
      to the same Government Department). Criteria for the export of services 
      would be established on the same lines as those for exports of arms.
64
 
 
In addition, the Green Paper raises the possibility of a registration of PMCs, 
the notification of the government of contracts for which companies are 
bidding, and a general licence for private military services to a specified list 
of countries.
65
 Conversely, the Green Paper seems most sceptical of the last 
option, arguing that it ‘would provide little protection for the public inter- 
est’.66 However, the Green Paper admits that a general licence could be 
used in conjunction with other regulatory measures. The Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee report broadly follows this line by recommending that ‘each contract 
for a military/security operation overseas should be subject to a separate 
licence, with the exception of companies engaged in the provision of non- 
continuous services for whom the Government considers a general licence 
would suffice’.67 However, the Committee also supports that ‘private military 
and security companies be required to obtain a general licence before under- 
taking any permitted military/security activities overseas’.68 
    The third option of encouraging the self-regulation of the private security 
industry is considered insufficient in both documents because it would prevent 
the government from restraining private security companies which were 
acting contrary to British national interests abroad.
69
 
 
 
International Regulation through the European Union 
 
International regulation of private military services through the EU can also be 
divided into three categories: the harmonization of national regulations on 
private policing, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.
70 
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Private Policing 
As the preceding section has illustrated, national regulations of private poli- 
cing and security vary widely within the EU and thus also their influence on 
the provision of private military services. Nevertheless, the area of private 
policing has potentially the broadest implications for the international regu- 
lation of the private military sector because it technically falls under the com- 
petences of the EU. The European Court of Justice has established this 
competence in several rulings according to which private security counts as 
an ’economic sector’ and as such falls under the regulation of the internal 
market.
71
 However, the movement towards common European regulations 
on private policing has so far been rather slow. A Spanish initiative concerning 
the establishment of a network of contact points of national authorities respon- 
sible for private security was rejected by the European Parliament for formal 
reasons.
72
 However, the committee of the European Parliament in charge of 
the issue was in favour of harmonizing member states’ regulations of the 
private security sector and the Council adopted on 13 June 2002 a recommen- 
dation regarding the cooperation between the competent national authorities 
of member states responsible for the private security sector.
73
 Further pressure 
for common European regulations is exerted by the Confederation of Euro- 
pean Security Services (CoESS) and the trade union federation Uni-Europa 
which signed on 18 July 2003 a Code of Conduct for the private security 
sector. The sectoral social partners believe ‘that the rules governing their 
sector need to be harmonized across the EU. This will be particular important 
when the ten new member states will join the EU next year’.74 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
While the harmonization of private policing legislation within the EU is a pro- 
spect for the future, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
EU has already been used to control the export of some types of private mili- 
tary services, such as the transfer of services related to WMD and embargoed 
destinations, the trafficking and brokering of arms, the spread of small arms 
and light weapons, and the maintenance and use of military equipment. As 
has been illustrated above, the first two have been endorsed through Joint 
Actions and Common Positions requesting national legislations. 
    More directly, however, the EU has used ad hoc Regulations at the EU 
level to control the export of private military services to certain destinations 
in response to civil wars and regional conflicts. Specifically, the transfer of 
technical services related to military equipment and activities has progress- 
ively been the target of EU restrictions since the mid-1990s.
75 
Thus, in 
January 2005, no less than seven countries, Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, 
Myanmar/Burma, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, were subject to an 
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EU-wide embargo of technical services related to military activities.
76
 
Previously, similar restrictions on the transfer of military technology and 
services have been applied to Afghanistan,
77
 Ethiopia and Eritrea,
78
 the 
former Yugoslavia,
79
 Libya
80
 and Nigeria.
81
 
    Crucially, the EU definition of ’technical services’ in most of these Regu- 
lations is considerably broader than those embraced in many of the national 
export legislations examined above. In the case of Liberia, for instance, it 
includes ‘technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufac- 
ture, maintenance or use of arms and related material of all types including 
weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary 
equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned’.82 
    Further Joint Actions have been adopted regarding the transfer of small 
arms and light weapons, which can be facilitated by the operations of PMCs 
in developing countries.
83
 In 1998, the Council thus adopted Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP on the EU contribution to combating the destabilizing accumu- 
lation and spread of small arms and light weapons.
84
 Amongst others, the Joint 
Action envisaged that the EU shall enhance efforts to build a consensus in 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the OSCE for 
restrictive arms export criteria as provided in the EU Code of Conduct. More- 
over, the Joint Action proposes that member states ‘shall seek to increase the 
effectiveness of their national actions in the field of small arms’.85 
    In 2002, it was replaced by Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP which also 
included the export of ammunition for small arms and light weapons and 
expanded the list of measures sought to counter the spread of small arms.
86
 
In direct application of the Joint Actions, the Council passed two Decisions 
which offered the government of Cambodia assistance in the development 
of appropriate legislation for the possession, use and sale of small arms and 
ammunitions and for general disarmament measures.87 Other projects directed 
at the finding, collection and destruction of small arms were agreed on with 
regard to Georgia/South Ossetia
88
 and Mozambique (Operation Rachel).
89
 
 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
Another element which has emerged out of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy is the EU Code of Conduct on Armaments Exports.
90
 The Code of 
Conduct was drawn up in June 1998 in order to set high common standards 
for conventional arms transfers and to facilitate the exchange of information 
about arms exports among member states. Furthermore, the Code of 
Conduct called for the circulation among the member states of confidential 
annual reports on their arms exports and the implementation of the Code, 
as well as for the production of a consolidated report by the EU. The first 
such report was published in November 1999.
91
 It was four pages long 
and observed the initial efforts to establish institutional channels of 
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communication on arms transfers among the member states. Since then the 
detail of each report has increased every year.
92
 The fifth report published 
in December 2003 was 42 pages long and included lists of arms export 
volumes by country destinations and exporting member states.
93
 Moreover, 
since all member states are required to produce annual national reports as 
the basis for the consolidated report, many member states have decided to 
also make their national data on armaments exports public. 
    The impact of the Code of Conduct has not only been the increase of trans- 
parency concerning armaments exports from the EU, but also the growing har- 
monization of national arms export legislation discussed in the preceding 
section. The harmonization of arms controls is particularly important 
because it makes it more difficult for PMCs to evade national controls by 
settling in those member states with the least restrictive regulations. Mercen- 
ary companies may still be able to move offshore. But companies which offer 
services concerning the operation, management and maintenance of military 
equipment frequently rely on the skilled labour forces available in European 
countries and are less flexible. Since harmonization has typically between 
implemented in the form of stricter controls among member states, the 
Code of Conduct has strengthened the regulation of private military services. 
As the preceding section has illustrated, most EU member states have thus 
increased the range of national controls which apply to the transfer of 
private military services, such as trafficking and brokering of arms or the 
maintenance and operation of military equipment in countries subject to inter- 
national embargoes. Moreover, with the enlargement of the EU, the number of 
countries subscribing to the export control standards endorsed in the Code has 
increased from 12 to 25. Already before accession, most aspirant countries had 
aligned themselves to the Code of Conduct and a number of associated or 
allied countries have embarked upon measures to tighten their national 
export controls in line with the Code, including Turkey, Croatia, the EFTA 
countries and Canada.
94
 Finally, in December 2000 the EU and the United 
States agreed on a US ’ EU Declaration on Responsibility in Arms Exports.95 
    The case of controls over the trafficking and brokering of arms illustrates 
the success of the Code of Conduct and, in its execution, the Council’s Con- 
ventional Arms Exports Working Group (COARM) in strengthening national 
controls. The member states first identified the issue of brokering as a key 
problem in their annual report on the implementation of the Code in 2000. 
They wrote: ‘The member states intend to continue and deepen their discus- 
sions on the procedures for monitoring arms brokers’ activities in order to 
incorporate this special topic - the importance of which has been recognized - 
into the process of convergence of the member states’ control policies’.96 By 
2001, member states had agreed on a set of guidelines for controlling broker- 
ing as the basis for national legislation.
97
 The result, as mentioned above, has 
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been the Council Common Position on the control of arms brokering passed in 
June 2003 which has made binding the national regulation of brokering among 
the member states.98 
 
 
The Dynamics and Future of EU Controls of Private Military Services 
 
The preceding sections have illustrated that the range of regulative measures 
which control the domestic provision and international export of private mili- 
tary services in Europe is much more comprehensive than typically noted. 
Although some authors and organizations criticize the still limited scope 
and insufficient implementation of existing arms and military service regu- 
lations in Europe,
99
 the above has demonstrated that the member states of the 
EU are progressively recognizing the importance of regulating not only the 
export of military equipment, but also of related services. In addition, the par- 
ticular dynamics of policy making within the EU, such as the pressures for the 
harmonization of national legislation, have contributed to the strengthening of 
controls. This section analyzes how the regulation of private military services 
has increased progressively since the mid-1990s. Moreover, based on these 
developments it discusses the prospects of a common European regime for 
military service exports. 
    The regulation of private military services in Europe appears to have pro- 
gressed along two axes: functionally and geographically. On the functional 
axis, one can note attempts to control the ‘soft’ end of private security ser- 
vices, such as private investigation and policing, on the one hand, and the 
‘hard’ end, such as mercenaries and PMCs, on the other. On the geographical 
axis, there appear to be simultaneous efforts to regulate private military ser- 
vices from the national and the international arena. The advantage of these 
concurrent developments seems to be the evolution of a system of multilevel 
governance of the private security sector in which overlapping regulations and 
regional institutions and regimes strengthen each other. Disadvantages include 
the complexity and inconsistency of the emerging controls which currently 
leave loopholes for PMCs and which put a heavy administrative burden on 
regulators. 
    Crucially, both axes converge within the EU, allowing it to play a central 
role in determining the future regulation of private military services. Along the 
functional axis, the EU is, on the one hand, under increasing pressure to har- 
monize or even integrate the regulation of private security services among the 
member states due to the rulings of the Court of Justice which suggest that 
private security services should operate under the conditions of the internal 
market. On the other hand, the EU is progressively laying out common stan- 
dards for the export of military equipment and services under the Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports and through Joint Actions and Common Positions 
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under the CFSP. Along the geographical axis, the EU influences national regu- 
lations through common European standards and vice versa. Moreover, the 
EU takes an active role in the geographical expansion of its control standards 
within the international community both through enlargement and bilateral 
agreements with other states. 
    As a consequence of this conversion, the EU has been put into a position of 
considerable influence and authority over the expansion of private military 
service controls. Moreover, the EU has been taking an active role in furthering 
military service regulation. This role appears to be driven by two factors: inte- 
gration and the outside representation of the EU. The growing scope and con- 
vergence of national legislation on private policing services, which has been 
characterized by requirements for registration, more extensive training and 
the vetting of private policing personnel, can thus be explained by the press- 
ures for the harmonization of national controls in support of the internal 
market. While so far the EU has not taken a direct role in the establishment 
of common control standards, the European Court of Justice has already 
asserted the authority of the Union on this issue through its rulings. Combined 
with the pressure from companies, employers’ associations such as the CoESS 
and European labour unions, it therefore appears to be merely a question of 
time before the EU will proceed to establish common standards for the regu- 
lation of private policing services ’ at least within the territory of the Union. A 
precedent for a common regime was set in 1998 with the EU controls on dual- 
use goods, i.e. goods with civil and military applications, which could be used 
as a model for or to subsume the regulation of private military services.100 
    At the same time, national arms control policies are increasingly affected 
by coordination through common foreign and security policies as member 
states aim to increase their international leverage by using the EU as their 
representative in international fora, such as the United Nations, the OSCE 
or the Wassenaar Agreement. While initially, the EU appears to have 
merely endorsed international arms controls agreements and embargoes 
through subsequent Joint Actions and Regulations, today its stated goal is to 
influence the level of international controls by promoting EU standards. 
New legislation on private military services, such as the transfer of small 
arms and light weapons, trafficking and brokering and the export of technical 
assistance, among the member states has been a direct consequence of these 
developments within the EU. Of course it needs to be noted that so far not 
all member states have implemented these policies and that the level of 
national controls can vary in significant details. However, pressures for 
common and higher control standards can only be expected to rise in the 
long term and with it the role of the EU in negotiating them. 
    The growing geographical scope of private military service regulations 
can also be linked to the EU. In particular, the preceding section has shown 
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that European enlargement and with it the extension of the internal market 
have encouraged prospective member states and states which seek closer 
economic relations with the EU to harmonize their export controls with 
those of the current members. The geographical expansion of private military 
service controls is further facilitated by the above-mentioned policies of the 
EU regarding the common representation of the member states in international 
organizations and control regimes and common foreign and security policies 
directed at the internationalization of EU export control standards. Both enlar- 
gement and CFSP are thus likely to help spread stricter regulations for the 
transfer of private military services from the regional to the international level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article has been to broaden our understanding of the extent and 
potential of national and international regulation concerning the provision and 
export of private military services in Europe. To do so, it has proposed three 
modifications to the current debate over PMCs. 
    First, the preceding discussion has proposed to widen the scope for the 
analysis of private military forces in definitional and geographical terms. 
Thus, it has argued that the predominant focus on mercenaries and combat 
companies is misleading since it excludes from the analysis private military 
services which are provided by other actors, such as defence corporations 
and private security firms. More suitable appears to be a definition which is 
based on the types of services which should be controlled rather than the 
actors which offer these services. In addition, this article has argued that a 
comprehensive analysis of the proliferation and regulation of private military 
services should recognize that the primary growth market for private military 
and military support services is not among failed states in Africa, but among 
the industrialized nations of Europe and North America. 
    Second and because of this broader analysis, the preceding sections have 
been able to illustrate that the regulation of private military services extends 
beyond the national and international regimes on mercenaries and PMCs. 
Other relevant control measures include national legislation on private secur- 
ity and policing firms, the regulation of arms exports and the common foreign 
and security policies of the EU. 
    Third, because of the diverse array of control mechanisms which directly 
or indirectly infiuence the private military service sector in Europe and 
because of the variety of national and international organizations involved 
in the regulation of private military force, this article has contended that 
other factors than supply and demand or national interest play a growing 
role in shaping these controls. The institutional dynamics of the EU are par- 
ticularly central. Thus, this article has sought to illustrate that the interaction 
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between the harmonizing pressures of the internal market and the increasing 
role of the EU in representing its member states in international regimes 
and organizations have contributed to the tightening of private military 
service controls since the mid-1990s. 
    What are the consequences of this analysis for the debate over the regulation 
of private military services’ Most contemporary efforts to control the growing 
private military sector have aimed towards new, preferably global, regimes on 
mercenaries and PMCs. However, in order to function, these regimes not only 
need the support of a sufficient number of signatories, they also require a strong 
normative commitment in the absence of global monitoring mechanisms or 
effective sanctions. As a consequence, progress on a global regime for 
private military services has been limited. The United Nations Convention on 
Mercenaries has few signatories and even more restricted application. 
    This article suggests that there might be a faster and more effective way to 
enhance the regulation of private military services. It shows that overlapping 
national and international regulations, while not perfect, can create a dynamic 
by which a centrally placed actor such as the European Union can exploit 
pressures for harmonization and integration in favour of more comprehensive 
control mechanisms. For European governments the appeal is that common 
and extensive international controls will be more cost efficient and easier to 
implement than national controls since they eliminate duplication, whereas 
the industry is likely to support such regulations because it will eliminate com- 
petitive disadvantages. Recognizing both, the EU appears to have accepted 
this role. 
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